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Extraterritoriality, Externalities, and CrossBorder Trade: Some Lessons from the United
States, the European Union, and the World
Trade Organization
MAX S. JANSSON

I.

INTRODUCTION

Heating and cooling, producing fuel, and generating
electricity can be done with different methods and from a variety
of resources. The choice of process and production method (PPM)
will, however, be crucial for the environmental impact of the
activity. Although each method in the field of energy will have
some negative impacts, there is a general consensus in the United
States and the European Union (EU) that current use of fossil
fuels with their high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is
unsustainable. Hence, a transition in the energy sector is taking
place. On both sides of the Atlantic, initiatives have been taken
both on union/federal-level and on state-level to promote
renewable energy. Notable measures include tax incentives,
subsidies, feed-in-tariffs (FITs),1 and renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs).2 When it comes to biofuels, only sustainable


Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The research was conducted
within the framework of project eCoherence, financed by the Academy of
Finland.
1. A feed-in-tariff is a tariff that is above the market price for energy and is
guaranteed to be paid to producers of energy from renewable energy sources
over a given period of time. Today in Energy: Feed-in Tariff, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471
[https://perma.cc/ULR4-ZNE6].
2. Renewable portfolio standards require that actors such as producers or
distributors provide a certain share/quota of their energy from renewables.
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alternatives, as defined by specific sustainability criteria, will be
eligible for support.3
Measures within the diverse range of emerging strategies to
tackle climate change and promote the transition of the energy
sector represent new forms of intervention in the market and may
conflict the traditional conception and values of free trade. These
values of free trade have been incorporated in the U.S. Dormant
Commerce Clause,4 EU free movement rules,5 and World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)6 and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT)7. As a rule, measures are prima facie
prohibited in case of discriminatory effects but may be justified on
for example grounds of environmental protection.8 The concept of
discrimination in this article refers to both de jure and de facto
discrimination as understood in the context of EU and WTO law.
It is broader than the concept of discrimination under the
Dormant Commerce Clause as it covers most, if not all, cases of
undue burden on interstate trade. A measure is generally
discriminatory if it explicitly differentiates on the basis of
geography or if it, as a whole, has the effect of burdening out-ofstate interests more than in-state interests.9

Today in Energy: Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?
id=4850 [https://perma.cc/YX7B-7E6H].
3. Assemb. 32, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); 40 C.F.R. § 80.1405 (2015);
Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and
Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC,
art. 17, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16, 36–38; see also Max. S. Jansson & Harri Kalimo,
On a Common Road Towards Sustainable Biofuels? EU and U.S. Approaches to
Regulating Biofuels, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL.& PUB. HEALTH L., 104, 109 (2014).
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, for the constitutional origins of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 34–36, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 61 [hereinafter TFEU] (outlining the
fundamental principles on free movement of goods).
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
7. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.1–2.2, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121.
8. See infra Part IV(A).
9. See infra Part III.
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Many cases have been initiated that evolve around the trade
law compatibility of state measures that explicitly differentiate
between in-state and out-of-state products under the U.S.
Constitution,10 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)11 and WTO law.12 In addition, there have been
claims of more indirect discrimination arising from the energy
transition. In the United States, conventional industries in states
rich with fossil fuels have filed lawsuits with the aim to question
the compatibility of the energy transition with applicable free
trade regime. For example, both a state-level RPS13 and a coal
moratorium,14 as well as biofuels sustainability programs,15 have
been targeted. Recently, it has even been argued that fossil fuel
10. See, e.g., Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777-CJB, 2014 WL 1509780, at *5
(D. Del. Apr. 17, 2014) (in-state requirement repealed, case dropped); Complaint
at 1, 20–24, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-cv-40070-FDS
(D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2010) (in-state requirement repealed, case settled); Missouri
ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386 S.W.3d 165, 175
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (in-state requirement repealed, case dropped); see also In re
Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 511 (R.I. 2011)
(declining to address the claims of unconstitutionality); Complaint, Riggs v.
Curran, No. 1:15-CV-00343-S-LDA (D.R.I. Aug. 13, 2015); Notice of Appeal of
Appellants Champaign County and Goshen, Union and Urbana Townships, In re
Application of Champaign Wind, L.L.C., No. 2013-1874 (Ohio Nov. 26, 2013);
Comm’n Review of its Rules for the Alt. Energy Portfolio Standard, No. 13-0652EL-ORD, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 15, 2014) (in-state
requirement repealed); Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement, No.
4185 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 16, 2010).
11. Joined Cases C‑204/12 & C‑208/12, Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse
Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, 2014 E.C.R. I-2192, ¶
40; Case C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, 2014 E.C.R. I2037, ¶ 25; Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I2159, ¶ 26.
12. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 1.7(c), WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R (May
6, 2013); see also Request for Consultations by the United States, India –
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, at 1, 2, WTO Doc.
WT/DS456/1 (Feb. 11, 2013); Request for Consultations by China, European
Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector, at 3, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012).
13. See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015)
(deciding whether Colorado’s RPS program violated the dormant commerce
clause), cert. denied, 136 U.S. 595 (2015).
14. See generally North Dakota. v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn.
2014).
15. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (9th
Cir. 2013); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA,
2015 WL 5665232, at *2, *4 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2015).

3

JANSSON

440

- FINAL

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

5/4/2016 6:43 PM

[Vol. 33

support would burden nuclear energy, including that from out-ofstate.16 The EU Commission, in turn, advised Austria not to ban
the import of nuclear power with reference to its impact on free
trade.17 In the context of WTO law, Argentina has already
requested consultations with the EU under the WTO regime to
address its claim that EU sustainability criteria on biofuels in
practice favour European fuels over Argentinean fuels and,
therefore, contradict rules of free trade.18 Finally, importing
states, like the EU, have proposed restrictions on the imports of
tar sands,19 and Canada has stated that it will take action.20
These cases on PPM rules can be expected to increase with more
states taking sustainability action.21
Rules and restrictions on PPMs adopted by states raise
questions related to the extraterritorial effects and objectives of
these rules. The intention here is to illustrate how tests of
extraterritoriality are taking shape in trade law. The
developments in trade law are framed against the backdrop of
limiting negative externalities to optimize utility or welfare as an
economic—or perhaps even ethical—theory. Yet, as this article
concludes, the question of whose or which externalities are given
16. Amended Complaint, Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick L.L.C. v. Ziebelman,
No. 15-cv-230 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015).
17. Claus Hecking, Umstrittenes Umweltgezetz: Osterreich Stoppt Import von
Atomstrom, SPIEGEL (July 3, 2013, 2:47 PM), www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/
energiewende-oesterreichs-totaler-atomausstieg-a-909206.html
[https://perma.cc/8EH2-6KDZ]; Markus Stingl, Kompromiss im Atom-Streit,
KURIER (Apr. 13, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://kurier.at/wirtschaft/kompromiss-imatom-streit/774.061 [https://perma.cc/R8HC-N4CM].
18. Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Union and Certain
Member States – Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of
Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry, at 3–4, WTO Doc.
WT/DS459/1 (May 15, 2013).
19. See James Crisp, Canada Tar Sand Will Not Be Labelled ‘Dirty’ After All,
EURACTIV.COM (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/canadatar-sands-will-not-be-labelled-dirty-after-all-310910
[https://perma.cc/9DG7W9H2] (noting that the final agreement on assigning tar sands a higher
emission value was never struck and the approach was abandoned in December
2014); see also Directive 2009/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L140) 88, 88–89 (requiring that
fuel refiners reduce the GHG intensity of sold fuel).
20. Damian Carrington, Canada Threatens Trade War with EU over Tar
Sands, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2012, 5:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2012/feb/20/canada-eu-tar-sands [https://perma.cc/JW5N-KLCM].
21. THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 230 (J.H.H. Weiler ed. 2000).
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relevance may need to be determined by other principles or
perceptions of “fairness.”
In this article, PPM rules are analyzed under three
jurisdictions: the United States, the EU, and the WTO. The
approach is justified by the fact that their rules on interstate
trade reflect very similar basic objectives related to antiprotectionism. Moreover, the regimes, to a large extent, share the
same structure of rules on prohibition balanced with rules on
justification. All in all, the regimes reveal similar syntax. The
comparability of the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
with both WTO law and EU free movement law has been
highlighted already in previous research.22
II. EFFICIENCY AND EXTERNALITIES
Economic integration and trade law rests on the idea of
comparative advantages and efficiency gains.23 This applies for
all three jurisdictions.24 With efficiency so close to the core of
trade law, it feels natural to view and explain the law from this
perspective. Posner has taken this analysis even a step further,
arguing that the efficiency of law is an ethical and scientific
theory.25
Efficiency is an overarching concept that covers several,
partly even conflicting, theories. For example, Jeremy Bentham
argued for a utilitarian approach to law reform.26 In his model, it
is utility that should be maximized.27 However, in trade law,
discrimination is prohibited even if it in some circumstances may
increase utility in a highly patriotic society. Posner in turn
argued that welfare maximization could work as a theory for

22. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy,
83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 1300 (1997). See generally HARRI KALIMO, E-CYCLING:
LINKING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EC AND THE U.S. (2006).
23. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733,
737 (1999); Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming
the Law of Trade Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 803 (2012).
24. Id. at 804.
25. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 13 (1981).
26. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789).
27. See id.
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explaining law.28 Apart from the question of whether utility or
welfare should be maximized, theories on efficiency also differ
with regards to the definition of an efficient state of affairs. For
example, efficiency can be defined as Pareto optimality or KaldorHicks efficiency.29 These definitions of efficiency have been
linked to various interpretations of the proportionality test in
trade law.30
Regardless of which of the above theories on efficiency is
adopted, limiting externalities can still play a role. Regulation
that forces the polluter to take into account the full costs of the
pollution is said to cause an internalization of the externalities.
This has been regarded as both efficient and reasonable.31 It has
also caught the attention of some law and economics scholars.32
Posner viewed it as the duty of the state to take care of the
externalities.33
While states accept the efficiency benefits of free trade, they
are still granted the right to adopt measures that may prima facie
contradict the free trade objectives if the measure relies on a
valid ground of justification. One way to understand the inclusion
of grounds of justification in trade law is that they legitimize
measures tackling externalities to achieve an optimal level in the
society. The balancing of “economic” and “non-economic” values
thus serves this particular objective.34
All economic theories, including the free market ideal and the
idea of limiting externalities, are value-laden.35 In accordance

28. POSNER, supra note 25, at vii.
29. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 399 (Julian Rivers
trans. 2002).
30. See Aurelien Portuese, Principle of Proportionality as Principle of
Economic Efficiency, 19 EUR. L. J. 612 (2013).
31. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 38–40 (2nd
ed. 1997).
32. Particularly, for instance, the Yale School of Law and Economics. See
Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and
Economics, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 259, 264 (2004).
33. POSNER, supra note 25, at 103.
34. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality, Judicial Review, and
Global Constitutionalism, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 173, 206 (Giorgio
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009).
35. ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE 48–56 (1990); Kenneth L. Avio, Three Problems of Social
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with radical libertarian policies, state intervention should also be
minimized in the environmental sector. Prohibitions and
standards set by governments are thus regarded as less efficient
than a model of clearly defined individual rights in resources and
social pressure.36 At the other extreme, environmental protection
is regarded as a good per se, without any need for justification in
terms of efficiency. According to Ronald Dworkin, wealth and its
maximization would not even be a component of social value.37
Sustainable development has so far been linked to human
development under economic law.38 Yet, that is not the only
plausible approach and environmental protection could be a goal
of its own.
It is not the intention here to argue what must or should be
understood in terms of efficiency. Principles such as coherence,
transparency, participation and accountability may equally be
elements of justice. The aim is instead to explain how trade law
can be understood in terms of efficiency, more specifically through
limiting externalities, and what the limits of such approach may
be in light of recent case law developments concerning
extraterritoriality.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE LAW OF
PROHIBITION
A. Background and U.S. Case Law
The PPM may or may not affect the physical characteristics
of the end product. For example, biofuels may be produced from
various resources with more or less sustainable methods. The
difference in the process may to some extent be reflected in the
properties of the fuel. Electricity, in turn, is always an identical
product regardless of whether it was produced from fossil fuels
through a process of high pollution or if it was produced from
renewable resources.
Organisation: Institutional Law and Economics Meets Habermasian Law and
Democracy, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 501, 503 (2002).
36. Libertarian Party, Libertarian Party Platform (June 2014), https://
www.lp.org/files/2014_LP_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FRR-WQ3G].
37. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 195 (1980).
38. Emily B. Lydgate, Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual
Supportiveness to Balancing, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 632–33 (2012).
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State regulations that set sustainability criteria for the PPMs
of energy do not primarily target the environmental effects of
consumption in the importing state. Such effects would depend on
the physical characteristics of the good. Instead, the rules target
the sustainability of the production phase, which, with respect to
imports, takes place out-of-state. This has raised questions as to
what extent state regulation may have extraterritorial effects.
Extraterritoriality in the law of justification deals with the
geographical scope of the environment that the state aims to
protect and will be dealt with in later sections. This section
focuses on extraterritoriality in the law of prohibition.
Under international law, states may rely on a broad range of
tests in order to establish a link between the state and what is
regulated.39 The jurisdiction of U.S. states is also limited to their
territory and states should not regulate in the jurisdiction of
other states.40 One of the objectives of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is to guarantee that those without political representation
are not burdened.41 Unlike in international law and EU law
where the prohibition of extraterritorial regulation stems from
general principles, the extraterritoriality test has become an
integral part of the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
even if it could equally well be viewed as a separate general
principle of federalism.42
The Dormant Commerce Clause targets protectionism in the
form of discrimination but also prohibits extraterritorial
measures. A finding of extraterritoriality is often fatal for the

39. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–20 (Sept. 7,
1927).
40. Patrick Zomer, Note, The Carbon Border War: Minnesota, North Dakota,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 60, 80 (2011).
41. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989) (laying out the Complete
Auto test), abrogated by Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 136 S. Ct.
1787 (2015); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185–86
(1938) (laying out the political representation test); see also Patricia
Weisselberg, Comment, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: Can
California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power
Plants Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185,
207–08 (2007).
42. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1873 (1987).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3

8

JANSSON

2016]

5/4/2016 6:43 PM

- FINAL

EXTRATERRITORIALITY & TRADE

445

state measure since it may be either declared unconstitutional,43
or subject to strict scrutiny.44 The extraterritoriality test has
mostly been applied in connection with price affirmation laws.45
These are laws by which the state has tried to influence the
prices in its market by regulating, for example, that imports
should not have been purchased below a minimum price or that
companies cannot export to other states for a lower price.
The extraterritoriality test probably could have been applied
with equal reference to competitive advantages and protectionist
A characteristic of depriving the competitive
behavior.46
advantage of out-of-state industries is namely that it tends to
reduce imports and that is what the price affirmation laws
The Supreme Court has in any case
appeared to do.47
emphasized the need for economic unity and formulated the
extraterritoriality test to prohibit directly regulating out-of-state
commerce, regulating conduct wholly outside the state, or
practically controlling commerce wholly out-of-state.48 Finally,
the Court may also invalidate a measure if it creates norm
conflicts or could create such conflicts if many states adopted
similar measures.49

43. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir.
1995); see also Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir.
1999) (per curiam).
44. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910 (D. Minn. 2014).
45. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336-37 (1989); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986); Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
46. See Energy & Envt’l Legal v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171–74 (10th Cir.
2015) (upholding Colorado’s renewable energy mandate finding it neither a price
control statute nor discriminatory to out-of-state consumers or producers), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015); see also Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (appearing to
have realized the underlying protectionism); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243, 293–94 (1999); cf. Report of
the Panel, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks
by Provincial Marketing Agencies, ¶ 5.31, DS17/R (Feb. 18, 1992) (finding
discrimination in the case of a minimum price law).
47. Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade
Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs, 3 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 122 (2013).
48. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 332, 336–37; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476
U.S. at 579; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982).
49. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642.
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It has been argued that the extraterritoriality test would only
apply to price control schemes.50 The test was, however, applied
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., which concerned an Illinois decision to
restrict the acquisition of shares by a non-Illinois company from
non-Illinois shareholders.51 A very different case emerged in
Wisconsin, when the State adopted a regulation that restricted
the import of waste from other states that was not sufficiently
recycled. This measure could be categorized as an end-of-life
treatment rule targeting not just specific business transactions
but also state-wide policy.52 The Seventh Circuit ruled against
the measure, concluding that such end-of-life treatment rule
targeting the policy of other states was extraterritorial.53 An
amended version of the law that only allowed imports from states
with a recycling standard also did not survive a legal challenge.54
Rules on production methods and end-of-life treatment are
similar in the sense that both may address aspects of
sustainability that often leave no trace in the physical
characteristics of the good.55 Hence, the principle of the case
could probably be extended to apply for PPM rules that target
state policies or standards.

50. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2013);
Energy & Envt’l Legal, 793 F.3d at 1173–74.
51. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642; see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d
362, 377–79 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that nondiscriminatory state laws may still violate the extraterritoriality doctrine);
Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l. Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating it would not be prohibited extraterritorial regulation if at least
one party of a regulated contract would be located in-state).
52. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing the district court’s finding that the statute’s notable local
benefits outweighed its small impact on interstate commerce). As a comparison,
in EU public procurement law and under the international Government
Procurement Agreement, (sustainability) criteria that apply to general company
policy and do not relate to the subject matter of the individual contract are
prohibited. Abby Semple, A Link to the Subject-Matter: A Glass Ceiling for
Sustainable Public Contracts? 9 (Univ. of London Dep’t of Politics, Working
Paper, 2014).
53. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 63 F.3d at 658, 661, 663.
54. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th
Cir. 1999).
55. LIFE CYCLE INITIATIVE, TOWARDS A LIFE CYCLE SUSTAINABILITY
ASSESSMENT 11 (2011).
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B. Creating Incentives Out-of-State and Market Access
Drawing the line between when a state is impermissibly
regulating out-of-state conduct and when it is not is no easy task.
Some relevance might be given to where the primary transaction
takes place. Hence, if the primary transaction is wholly out-ofstate, the risk of finding the act unconstitutional is greater than
if the primary transaction is an interstate transaction.56 PPM
rules target imports and would, therefore, as a rule, not easily fall
inside the scope of illegal extraterritoriality.
The problem of PPM rules is illustrated well by the case of
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, where the court
referred to the extraterritoriality doctrine.57 The case concerned
the California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), a standard
that is applied to favour low-emitting transport fuels, such as
various forms of biofuels.58 A life-cycle analysis (LCA) was
applied to estimate the emissions of fuel pathways.59 The LCA
for a pathway incorporated emissions from growing the feedstock,
the refinery process (including efficiency and the source for
electricity used in operation), and the transport distances.60
California had calculated default values for several pathways but
also allowed producers to certify the emissions levels of their
individual production process.61 Fuels with high emissions
values were not barred from entering the market, but, since the
fuels supplied by retailers on average must not exceed certain
levels of pollution, those fuels with high emissions are given
lower priority.62
The LCFS awarded in-state bioethanol a lower default
emissions value than for Midwest bioethanol.63 To that end, both

56. Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce
Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 344–45 (2013).
57. 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev'd in part, 730 F.3d 1070
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding that LCFS regulations were not facially discriminatory
nor extraterritorial).
58. Id. at 1079–80.
59. Id. at 1081.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1082.
62. Id. at 1082, 1086–87.
63. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
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the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the question of discrimination and discussed the
doctrine of extraterritoriality. The district court reached the
conclusion that the LCFS was unconstitutional.64 Regulating the
emissions of bioethanol used in California would in fact target the
production of bioethanol out-of-state. Hence, according to the
The
court, the rule controlled extraterritorial conduct.65
reasoning of the district court would, for example, invite the
conclusion that measures incentivizing the reduction of GHGs
out-of-state are illegal extraterritorial regulation.66
The district court also pointed out that if more states adopted
similar types of rules, producers would face conflicting norms.67
This is true in the sense that producers utilizing certain feedstock
and production technology might be excluded from one market,
but not another. In order to gain access to all states, a producer
would need to comply with the state with the strictest regulation.
Under this broad interpretation of illegal extraterritorial effect,
any PPM rule would likely be prohibited. All PPM rules do at
least indirectly affect out-of-state conduct, and so do rules that do
not even concern PPMs.68
Several scholars have criticized the District Court for the
Eastern
District
of
California’s
application
of
the
extraterritoriality test.69
Only measures having a direct
extraterritorial effect should be prohibited.70 The traditional test
of extraterritoriality has been whether or not the measure can be
described as controlling of out-of-state conduct. Limiting the
scope of extraterritorial effect would mean that control of conduct
occurs when the state is dictating the commercial conduct in
another state, but not when it is using its own regulations to
influence out-of-state commerce by creating incentives.71 The
64. Id. at 1094.
65. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
66. Cf. Alcorn, supra note 47, at 165 (appearing to disagree with this
reasoning).
67. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1092–93 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
68. Alcorn, supra note 47, at 163; Engel, supra note 46, at 342.
69. See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 47; Lee & Duane, supra note 56.
70. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977).
71. Robert L. Molinelli, Renewable Energy Development: Surviving the
Dormant Commerce Clause, RENEWABLE, ALTERNATIVE, & DISTRIBUTED ENERGY

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/3

12

JANSSON

2016]

5/4/2016 6:43 PM

- FINAL

EXTRATERRITORIALITY & TRADE

449

difference between controlling and creating incentives is
obviously a fine line. Daniel Farber has argued that the almost
per se invalidity of measures caught by the extraterritoriality test
forms a reason for a narrow test.72 He argues that the Pike
balancing test, where costs and benefits of the measure are
compared, is generally a more suitable proportionality test for
PPM rules.73 It would seem justified to conclude that a PPM rule
is normally creating only incentives, but it can become obligatory
when it makes importation conditioned on state policy, as in the
Meyer cases.74
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court’s ruling on extraterritoriality.75 It stated that California
had an interest in out-of-state carbon emissions due to its global
effects.76 Therefore, California had the right to try and influence
out-of-state conduct through its regulation of contracts in
California.77 It highlighted that there were no evidence of
conflicting legal regimes.78 In addition, no state needs to change
its law in order for its industry to get market access in
California.79 In this respect, the case was different from the
Meyer cases. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the measure did
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL. (ABA Sec. Env’t, Energy & Res.), Sept. 2012, at
5–6. But see Margaret Tortorella, Note, Will the Commerce Clause “Pull the
Plug” on Minnesota’s Quantification of Environmental Externalities of Electricity
Production?, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1547, 1574–75 (1995).
72. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided
Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3 TRANSNAT’L
ENVTL. L. 31, 43 (2014).
73. Id.; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (leaving the
impression that Pike balancing could apply even with findings of
extraterritoriality, especially if it cannot be linked to any discriminatory effects).
74. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1999); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 652 (7th Cir.
1995).
75. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir.
2013).
76. See id. 1098–1100.
77. Id. at 1098–1101; see also Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639
F.3d 1154, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a state regulation requiring
ocean vessels sailing outside the shore of the state not to exceed a threshold for
sulfur emissions, although putting a restraint on vessels from other states
entering the waters of the state with imports was not deemed to be regulation
controlling out-of-state conduct).
78. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1105.
79. Id. at 1102–03.
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not target production, trade, or use of ethanol in any other
state.80 What it meant by production is rather unclear. The court
also emphasized that the PPM rule did not ban imports or
establish any thresholds.81 Hence, it would seem that the court
left open the possibility that PPM criteria for market access may
still breach the extraterritoriality principle.
The market access string of the extraterritoriality test would
seem closely related to the general test applicable in EU free
movement law, which prohibits discrimination in intracommunity trade as well as market access hindrances.82 The
European test to determine whether a measure is prima facie
prohibited is much broader than the U.S. test of undue burdens,
as it is not limited to discrimination but also covers cases of some
significant hindrances to market access in general.83 What
recent U.S. case law may suggest is a more limited application of
the test, since it would only apply in connection with findings of
extraterritoriality. Yet, extending the scope of prima facie
prohibited measures that far may not be received well in the
United States, bearing in mind the view held by some Supreme
Court Justices that the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine is
too broad.84 One should also note that defining the boundaries of
the market access test in the EU has proved to be problematic.
The question of extraterritoriality has been addressed in at
least three further recent cases in the field of energy. In American
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers. v. O’Keeffe, the district
court followed the reasoning in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
when it upheld the LCFS as implemented in Oregon.85 In Energy
& Environmental Legal Institute v. Epel, Colorado’s RPS was at

80. Id. at 1102.
81. See id. at 1102–03.
82. Max S. Jansson & Harri Kalimo, De Minimis Meets “Market Access”:
Transformations in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free
Movement Law?, 51 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 523, 524–26 (2014); cf. CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83–84 (1987) (emphasizing that the
measure does not prohibit trade altogether but still finding the act to be prima
facie prohibited).
83. See Jansson & Kalimo, supra note 82, at 524–25.
84. See Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 153 S. Ct. 1787, 1811–12 (2015)
(5–4 decision) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. No. 3:15-CV-00467-AA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128277, at *19 (D. Or.
Sept. 23, 2015).
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stake.86 Among other things, the claimants challenged the
constitutionality of promoting renewables through an RPS with
tradeable renewable energy credits (RECs).87 The district court
ruled that such system regulates the PPM of out-of-state
electricity only when imported to Colorado.88 Moreover, in
applying to such inter-state trade, the system only created
incentives for certain PPMs and did not set any standard for
market access.89 The approach in other words resembled that of
the Court of Appeals in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. The
It should be
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.90
emphasized that the Supreme Court has not yet confirmed the
narrow interpretation of the extraterritoriality test in the context
of PPM rules.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
appeared to apply a somewhat broader interpretation in North
Dakota v Heydinger.91 Minnesota had adopted a coal moratorium
by deciding not to grant permits to any new coal plants in-state
and by prohibiting imports from out-of-state new coal plants and
long-term agreements with energy plants that may increase state
power sector carbon emissions.92 North Dakota and its coal
companies challenged the law.93 The court observed that some
electricity cooperatives
out-of-state
have
members
in
Minnesota.94 In accordance with the law, these could not be
customers of electricity from coal. However, electricity is
generated to a multi-state grid. Thus, as a practical matter, the
Minnesota law also directly affected transactions with no parties
from Minnesota.95
The court concluded that the law had

86. No. 1:11-cv-00859, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60567, at *5 (D. Colo. May 1,
2014).
87. Id.
88. Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1179 (D. Colo.
2014).
89. Id. at 1179–80.
90. Energy & Envt’l Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015).
91. See generally North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn.
2014).
92. Id. at 897.
93. Id. at 908.
94. Id. at 916.
95. Id. at 907.
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extraterritorial reach, and the ruling was appealed to the Eighth
Circuit.96
The ruling in Heydinger does not necessary conflict with the
case of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. Minnesota targeted
electricity directly, which, unlike biofuels and RECs, cannot be
physically segregated once it has entered inter-state grids. Hence,
the rule would force any party interested to do business in
Minnesota to change their whole company policy. In contrast, the
California LCFS would apply only to those individual batches
imported to California and out-of-state producers could serve the
markets of other states with dirtier products.97
Some scholars have equally identified the difference between
the cases of California and Minnesota, but concluded that the
special nature of electricity should not have justified a different
outcome in the Minnesota case.98 Such view would gain some
support from the decision in the Colorado case, which was also on
electricity trade. An alternative is that the Minnesota case
differed from the Colorado case on one critical account—namely,
that Minnesota created (absolute) conditions for market access,
whereas the two other states only created market incentives in
the form of support schemes.99
James Coleman has argued that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal
in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union was flawed and that measures
to promote renewables would need and should be awarded an
exemption by Congress.100
Looking at recent cases, the
arguments for a contrary position appear strong. The
extraterritoriality test in the law of prohibition should only
exceptionally capture state regulation on the sustainability of
PPMs. This conclusion is of crucial importance from the
perspective of tackling externalities. A stricter extraterritoriality
test would severely restrict a state’s ability to take measures
96. Id. at 916–17. See generally Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, North Dakota
v. Heydinger, No. 14-2156 (8th Cir. Jan. 1, 2016).
97. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir.
2013).
98. Alexandra
B.
Klass
&
Elizabeth
Henley,
Energy
Policy,
Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
& ENERGY L. 127, 181–82 (2014).
99. Id. at 165.
100. James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1384 n.167, 1388–95 (2014).
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aimed at reducing externalities burdening its residents related to
climate change or air pollution originating in other states.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE LAW OF
JUSTIFICATION
A. Local and Global Objectives
Nations frequently adopt trade restrictions with the objective
to protect safety, public health, or the environment within their
territories. Criteria on the PPMs may, however, not have any
impact on the qualities of the final product that is imported. At
the same time, the environmental effects of the PPMs will at least
originate in the country where production takes place, which, in
the case of imports, is another country. The adoption of PPM
criteria has consequently sparked a debate on the question of
whether states may justify de jure and de facto discriminatory
trade restrictions with reference to the protection of global health
and environmental concerns, or even the protection of public
health and the environment in other states.101 It is, in other
words, a question of whether or not grounds of justification
should have extraterritorial reach.
Treaties like the TFEU, GATT, and the TBT Agreement
include the protection of public health as a ground of justification
without any explicit limitations to the geographical scope of that
objective.102 In light of the purpose of those trade law regimes,
though, some limitations may exist. Namely, with the
establishment of a free trade area, states have given up on some
of their sovereignty to decide on what goods to allow for import.
The grounds of justification can be understood as a safeguard
against, for example, environmental threats. Their purpose is not
101. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262.
102. This is in contrast to the SPS Agreement (Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401),
under which the only protection of national resources can justify exemptions to
the main free trade principles. The agreement is, however, to some degree of a
different nature than the GATT or the TBT. See generally KYLE BAGWELL &
ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM (2002) (for
arguments of a more narrow interpretation of GATT and the TBT Agreement,
which would strengthen coherence with the SPS Agreement).
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to offer Member States a tool to use trade policy only in order to
pressure other Member States to commit to policy changes, in, for
example, the environmental field or human rights protection.
In some early decisions, WTO panels appeared to view it
necessary that the justifiable benefit strived for is domestic.103 In
United States – Tuna (Mexico I), the panel condemned unilateral
measures on PPMs on the ground that they would endanger the
multilateral trade system.104 The panel still did not fully close
the door for accepting measures that target the protection of the
environment beyond the national borders.105 In United States –
Tuna (EC), the panel was more favourable towards
extraterritorial environmental objectives.106 The panel concluded
that protecting dolphins beyond U.S. borders was a legitimate
objective, even if the measure in the end could not be justified as
it did not pass the necessity test.107
The panel arrived at its conclusion in part by examining
Article XX as a whole.108 Article XX includes grounds of
justification such as the protection of public health and the
conservation of natural resources.109 The panel noted that in
accordance with Article XX(e) states could also justify restrictions
on trade in products of prison labour.110 Such restrictions would
be adopted for moral reasons and would relate to the protection
prisoners in foreign states. Hence, it reasoned that environmental
protection objectives could at least not categorically be
103. Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶¶ 7.200-.210, WTO Doc.
WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003).
104. Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶
5.27, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) GATT BISD (39th Supp.) [hereinafter United States
– Tuna (Mexico I)]; see also Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.40–.61, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (May
15, 1998).
105. United States – Tuna (Mexico I), supra note 104, ¶¶ 5.25–.27.
106. See Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
¶¶ 5.13–.20. DS29/R (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter United States – Tuna (EC)].
107. Id. ¶¶ 5.13–.20; see also Report of the Panel, Canada – Measures Affecting
the Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, ¶¶ 4.2–.7, L/6268 (Mar. 22,
1988), GATT BISD (35th Supp.); Report of the Panel, United States –
Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, ¶¶ 4.4–.15
L/5198 (adopted Feb. 22 1982), GATT BISD (29th Supp.), at 91, 112-14.
108. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶¶ 5.13–.20.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶¶ 5.16–.17.
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prohibited.111 An alternative reading of XX(e) would have been
plausible. One could understand the permitted objective of
protecting foreign prisoners to form lex specialis in relation to the
public morals,112 which is referred to as a ground of justification
in Article XX(a).113 Consequently, XX(a) and other paragraphs
under Article XX may not necessarily have the same geographical
scope as Article XX(e).
As a side note, in United States – Tuna (EC), the Europeans
together with several other states argued against unilateral
PPMs with extraterritorial environmental objectives.114
However, the EU has, as a union, more recently developed
criteria for sustainable PPMs that apply globally, for example, to
biofuels. The devil is probably in the detail and the position of the
EU may be related to precisely how the criteria have been
implemented.
A note by the secretariat after United States – Tuna (EC)
stated that the protection of resources within the nation may be a
ground of justification.115 The dispute settlement bodies had to
return to this issue in United States – Shrimp.116 There, the
Appellate Body discussed the objective of protecting turtles
outside of U.S. waters.117 The Appellate Body pointed out that
the species of turtles in question are endangered and that they
migrate.118 The migration of turtles may be a crucial point. Since
turtles migrate, it was no longer possible to separate domestically
protected and foreign turtles. In other words, the environmental
protection objective of the United States concerned a global
resource. Although the Appellate Body finally concluded that the
111. See id. ¶¶ 5.16–.17, 5.20.
112. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶ 3.41.
113. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. at
262.
114. See United States – Tuna (Mexico I), supra note 104, ¶ 4.11 (noting the
EU’s disproval of the United States’ unilateral PPM measure under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act).
115. Note by the Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice
Relating to Article XX Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of GATT, ¶¶ 27–30, WTO Doc.
WT/CTE/W/53 (July 30, 1997).
116. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 132–33, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct.12,
1998) [hereinafter United States – Shrimp (AB)].
117. Id. ¶¶ 115–134.
118. Id. ¶¶ 132–33.
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design of the U.S. law was arbitrary, it has accepted that
measures, in principle, could be justified with reference to the
protection of migratory species.119
The United States later abolished the arbitrary elements of
the law, but the law was still challenged by Malaysia. The
Appellate Body in United States – Shrimp (Article 21.5) noted
that, in accordance with the Rio Declaration of 1992, states
should, as far as possible, aim to address global environmental
challenges through international consensus.120 The Appellate
Body recognized that although the declaration sets a preference
for international action, it does not exclude the possibility of
unilateral measures.121 In addition, it is non-binding and may
only serve as a source for interpreting WTO provisions. Hence,
WTO law could at least not categorically prohibit the
extraterritorial scope of justifications.122
It may be recalled that while the United States has defended
its federal PPM rules in the WTO, there has been great
scepticism in the United States toward PPM rules adopted by its
states and their compatibility with the Constitution.123
Similarly, the EU Commission has generally been very sceptical
of unilateral PPM criteria. The disapproval of Dutch labels on
sustainable forestry illustrates this.124 However, some Member
States have recently developed sustainability criteria for solid
biomass that relies on a life-cycle assessment,125 and the
119. United States – Shrimp (AB), supra note 116, ¶¶ 133, 177–186.
120. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
¶ 124, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
121. Id.
122. United States – Tuna (EC), supra note 106, ¶ 3.16. The United States also
argued Article XX(c) illustrated the same point, since, under that paragraph,
states may implement restrictions on the import and export of gold and silver.
Id.
123. See supra Part III.
124. Compare JOCHEM WIERS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE EC AND THE
WTO: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 360–361 (1st ed. 2002) (finding that sustainable forest
management is an acceptable objective), with Case C-448/01, EVN AG &
Wienstrom GmbH v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-14527 (reflecting the Commission’s
long-standing view that environmental and social PPMs unrelated to the
characteristics of the end product may not be applied as, e.g., award criteria in
public procurement, even if that position is overruled by the ECJ).
125. See, e.g., Erin Voegele, UK Sets Sustainability Standards for Solid
Biomass, Biogas, BIOMASS MAG. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://biomassmagazine.com/
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Commission appears to have encouraged such development
without any notable concerns for the functioning of the internal
market.126
The EU has perhaps not adopted any consistent view on
extraterritoriality.127 However, in principle, the United States
and the EU could advocate for a different interpretation in WTO
law than either applies in its own trade regime because, within
their own systems, the United States and the EU try to foster
coherency and mutual trust, which may provide stronger
arguments against extraterritoriality than would be the case in
the more heterogenic WTO community.128
It has indeed been argued in the context of EU free
movement law that member states can only justify measures with
reference to the protection of health and environment within its
national borders.129 However, Advocate-General van Gerven once
took the view that when environmental issues can have transfrontier effects, a Member State should be justified in trying to
reduce it even if the source is located outside its jurisdiction.130

articles/9363/uk-sets-sustainability-standards-for-solid-biomass-biogas
[https://perma.cc/5CYU-YGZ7]. See generally U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE
CHANGE, IA NO: DECC0134, IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE
SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF SOLID AND GASEOUS BIOMASS
FEEDSTOCKS UNDER THE RENEWABLES OBLIGATION (RO) 7–8 (2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/41
5168/RO_Biomass_Sustainability_Govt_Response_Impact_Assessment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55LA-ZYYJ ] (revealing that the preparatory works contained
some discussion on the relation to EU free movement law); MINISTRY OF ECON.
AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION OF SOLID BIOMASS FOR
ENERGY PRODUCTION (2013), http://english.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2013/12/
Module_200.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM4S-2SM8] (discussing similar criteria
developed in Belgium and the Netherlands).
126. Commission Staff Working Document: State of Play on the Sustainability
of Solid and Gaseous Biomass Used for Electricity, Heating and Cooling in the
EU, at 9-11, SWD (2014) 259 final (July 28, 2014).
127. WIERS, supra note 124, at 363–65.
128. THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE?, supra note 21, at 138.
129. Case 8/74, Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in Procureur du Roi v.
Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5; see also Case C-5/94, The Queen v.
Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996
E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 20; ANDREAS R. ZIEGLER, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 84 (1996).
130. Case C-169/89, Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven in Criminal
Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2151, ¶ 7; see
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The case van Gerven analyzed, referred to as Van den Burg,
related to a Dutch ban on the import of red grouse, a bird not
found in the Netherlands.131 Although a bird conservation
directive authorized states to adopt stricter measures, the ECJ
concluded that such measures could only relate to domestically
The court
occurring migratory and endangered birds.132
interpreted the directive and Article 36 of the TFEU jointly,
which resulted in some confusion as regards to the applied
The protection of migratory birds appeared
principles.133
justifiable, but it was left unclear as to whether this stemmed
from the Treaty or the Directive. The case, however, gives some
reason to believe that the ECJ is sympathetic to the objective of
protecting global harms.134 This is further supported by its
reasoning in a case on the compatibility of airports with
international customary law with the application of the EU
Emissions Trading System on airlines from outside countries
landing within the EU.135 Although the case did not relate to free
movement law, it is worthy of note that the court made reference
to the global impacts of pollutions outside EU airspace to support
the argument that the EU had an interest to regulate flight
emissions outside its airspace and that the extraterritorial reach
of the ETS was justifiable in light of international law.136
The issue of extraterritoriality in law of justification has also
been tackled under the Dormant Commerce Clause.137 The U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that prima facie prohibited measures
may be justified in case of a legitimate local goal.138 This would
also Ludwig Krämer, Environmental Protection and Article 30 EEC Treaty, 30
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 111, 136 (1993).
131. See Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den
Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2160, ¶ 2.
132. Id. ¶ 12.
133. See id. ¶¶ 8–9.
134. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
135. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. & Others v. Sec’y of State for
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, ¶¶ 108, 125, 128.
136. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. & Others v. Sec’y of State for
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, ¶ 129.
137. Zomer, supra note 40, at 31–32; see also DAMIEN GERADIN, TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EC AND US LAW 66 (1997) (rejecting
any extraterritorial dimension with regards to the grounds of justification in US
and EU Law).
138. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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imply that states may introduce measures to protect its own local
environment, but not to protect the environment of other states.
The Court has also highlighted that states have no legitimate
interest in protecting non-residents.139
However, lower courts have ruled that the protection of outof-state wildlife is a legitimate objective. 140 Protecting wildlife
would in part also protect the fauna of the state implementing the
measure at least when the animals are migratory. What is more,
at least on one occasion, a lower court has concluded that
protecting out-of-state health was a legitimate objective when
adopted in conjunction with the objective of protecting in-state
reputation.141 This would suggest that the protection of out-ofstate interests might be thought of as acceptable at least when
the measure in part also advances some in-state objective. It
must be emphasized that these rulings do not form precedents.
They however illustrate the difficulty of defining the concept of
“local.”
In sum, it would appear that neither the U.S. nor the EU
regime contradicts the WTO law praxis to include global effects,
although, admittedly, undisputable precedent is lacking.142 It
would seem difficult to argue that a state should not have the
right to adopt trade restricting measures that may protect global
environmental resources because even if the behavior that is
targeted takes place abroad, the environmental effects of the
measure will at least indirectly take place within domestic
borders and each state should have the right to protect against
harm inflicted on its territory.143 To put it differently, not
139. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
140. Cresenzi Bird Importers Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1448
(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987); Palladio Inc. v. Diamond, 321
F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971); A. E.
Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d 118, 122–23 (N.Y. 1970).
141. Gov’t Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279–
80 (7th Cir. 1992) (concerning a ban on export of food in a truck that had been
used to import garbage).
142. LUDWIG KRÄMER, E.C. TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 111–14 (3d ed.
1998) (arguing for global effects as legitimate objectives in and EU law context);
see also GERADIN, supra note 137, at 32, 32 n.104 (pointing out the uncertainty
regarding this question). Compare KRÄMER, supra, with ZIEGLER, supra note
129, at 86–88 (presenting a more critical opinion).
143. ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 112–113
(2007).
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accepting any global harm as a ground for justification would
significantly restrict the right of states to tackle externalities.
B. Global Environmental Protection, the Energy Sector,
and De Minimis
Clean air and climate change concerns are global interests
much like migratory turtles. GHGs have a global reach and their
emission in any country or state will harm all states.144 Thus,
reducing carbon dioxide in any part of the world will create global
environmental benefits and therefore also local benefits for the
state adopting the measure.145 PPM requirements that also cover
energy imports would contribute to less pollution abroad, which
also should improve the air domestically. The Ninth Circuit
appeared to endorse this view when, in its analysis of the
compatibility with the Dormant Commerce Clause of the
sustainability requirements on biofuels in California’s LCFS, it
concluded that GHGs emitted as a result of PPMs in any state
would hurt California to a similar extent.146 PPM criteria that
tackle GHGs should serve a legitimate objective also in EU and
WTO law,147 even if some authors have expressed reservations in
this regard.148
Concerns that states with vast market power would gain
extensive influence over environmental policy worldwide form the
primary argument against a broad geographical scope for
legitimate objectives.149 Where powers such as the United
144. Thomas R. Karl & Kevin E. Trenberth, Modern Global Climate Change,
302 SCI. 1719, 1719–20 (2003); Joseph Allan MacDouglad, Why Climate Law
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2008); Rachel
Feinberg Harrison, Comment, Carbon Allowances: A New Way of Seeing an
Invisible Asset, 62 SMU L REV. 1915, 1917 (2009).
145. See Zomer, supra note 40, at 65 (discussing GHG emission mitigation as a
global/federal public good from the perspective of non-discrimination).
146. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080–81 (9th
Cir. 2013).
147. CHRISTINA VOIGT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN CLIMATE MEASURES AND
WTO LAW 226–27 (2009).
148. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 619 (2013); PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 209–13 (2005).
149. MAVROIDIS, supra note 148, at 212; HOWSE, supra note 143, at 111.
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States, China, or the EU implement PPM requirements that also
apply to imports, the exporting industry of smaller nations will
have little option but to change their production and processing
methods if they wish their industry to survive. The same concerns
apply to some extent of course to environmental and health
regulation that apply directly to products and not PPMs.
However, criteria for sustainable PPMs could be regarded as an
even more aggressive form of social or environmental imperialism
practiced by those states that throughout history have gained
their economic advantages over the developing world in part due
to lax past environmental regulation.
Farber has argued that a balance should be struck between
localism and globalism.150 A model of localism, where states can
only justify the protection of their own environment, would seem
insufficient, as it would turn a blind eye to the need of protecting
global environmental harm, whereas a model of globalism, where
even the out-of-state share of environmental effects form part of
the legitimate objective, may shift too much power to nations
with economic power.151 A test that focuses on global effects,
which may reach the state adopting the restriction, would offer
some type of compromise between the two extremes. Yet, such
test will be difficult to apply consistently in practice.
Even if states may have a legitimate interest to address
global GHGs, it has been argued that other pollutants emitted in
processing resources to generate energy only have a local
reach.152 For example, wind and hydropower stations mainly
interfere with the local ecology, even if some GHGs are
emitted.153 However, even if effects are mainly local, they will in
the long term become global. Importantly, soil or water pollution
as well as biodiversity effects are not necessarily any less severe
than emissions and pollution in the air. Various forms of air and
water pollution cause environmental harm that will travel from
one end of the United States, the EU, or even the world, to the
150. Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographical Nexus in
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1273 (1996).
151. Id. at 1270–73.
152. Zomer, supra note 40, at 72.
153. Joseph V. Spadaro, Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Electricity Generating
Chains: Assessing the Difference, 42 INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 19, 20
(2010).
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other end.154 As all environmental effects, sooner or later, will
have a global impact and consequently and will also reach the
state with the intention of adopting a restrictive measure, all
measures promoting environmental protection can be claimed to
benefit also the local environment. Consequently, Engel has
argued that states do have a legitimate interest in mitigating all
environmental harm that emerges out-of-state.155
The difficulties associated with the distinction of global
environmental effects from purely local effects in out-of-state
territories have sparked proposals of some form of de minimis
rule.156 Wiers suggests that the environmental objective should
be accepted only if the threat would have a direct, substantial and
foreseeable effect on the domestic environment.157 In the energy
sector, GHG emissions belong to those environmental concerns
that are clearly not purely foreign and would not be affected by a
de minimis threshold. The test would give green light to the
objective of fighting global climate change. Such test may,
however, have implications for other forms of pollution and
environmental risks. These include noise (from wind turbines),
soil contamination, biodiversity loss (from biofuels feedstock
plantation), waste (in the form of solar panels) or interference
with waterways (hydropower).
In reality, even without a de minimis test, there is a definite
possibility that when the cross-border environmental benefit is
very minimal, the state implementing the PPM rule will fail to
defend its measure as proportional. Some caution is still called
for. Any de minimis or proportionality test would need to be
applied so that it would not create a bias against slowly
accumulating severe effects nor against rare but severe incidents,
such as nuclear accidents. Hence, any potential test could take
into account both the magnitude and the probability of crossborder harm, but would need to be applied with a long-term
perspective on the effects. It should also be highlighted that such

154. Anne Havemann, Comment, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How
Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal
Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848, 873 (2012).
155. Engel, supra note 46, at 342–48.
156. See, e.g., Jansson & Kalimo, supra note 82.
157. WIERS, supra note 124, at 274.
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tests creating a de minimis threshold would, to a small degree,
bar states from tackling externalities.
C. Purely Out-of-State Effects
1.

Protection of Out-of-State Environment

Global environmental effects are in part local in the sense
that some of the effects eventually will impact the state that
adopts the restriction on PPMs. Although arguably all
environmental effects have this characteristic, a de minimis rule
would lead to the categorization of some effects with primarily
out-of-state consequences as falling outside the scope of
legitimate objectives. Section IV(C) of this paper tackles the
question of whether even protective measures against purely outof-state effects could be justifiable and the theory of a de minimis
rule consequently could be discarded.
While some have argued that the interest protected cannot be
purely foreign;158 others have still not excluded the possibility
that states could have extraterritorial legitimate interests under
each of the three jurisdictions.159 This aspect is relevant not only
in establishing whether, in the first instance, there are any
legitimate objectives but also in the analysis of whether the
environmental benefit is proportional in light of the restriction on
trade.
Under the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause, the harm shall
be local in accordance with the test established through case
law.160 The theory on the exclusion of purely foreign effects from
the geographical scope of public health and environmental
protection as grounds of justification has also never really been
put to test in WTO law, since appellate bodies have always, due
to the facts of the case, been able to avoid addressing the

158. Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food ex parte
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 20; Case 8/74, Opinion of
Advocate General Trabucchi in Procureur du Roi v. Gustave Dassonville, 1974
E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5; ZIEGLER, supra note 129, at 84–90.
159. KRÄMER, supra note 142, at 134; Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener
GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 31, 32 (2000); Engel, supra note 46, at 342–48.
160. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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question.161 The same is true for ECJ case law. For example, in
Van den Burg, the court ruled that states could justify stricter
national rules on bird conservation only if the birds occurred
domestically, where migratory or had been listed as
endangered.162 It thus rejected the protection of most birds that
occur out-of-state. The court may have only interpreted the
secondary legislation and intended to indicate that the provision
in the directive awarding Member States some flexibility did not
have an extraterritorial dimension. Alternatively, the ECJ took
the position that Article 36 of the TFEU should cover domestic
interests and global interest related to for example migratory
species.163 The addition of the interest to protect endangered
species could be explained by the fact that a serious threat of
extinction is related to global biodiversity and thus also a
sufficient concern for states where the species do not occur. The
ruling of the ECJ, however, did not explicitly address these
aspects.
The debate on the protection of extraterritorial effects
mirrors the discussion in legal theory as to whether the goal of
maximization of utility or welfare should also include the
positions of foreign individuals.164 To the extent environmental
effects do not affect the territory of a state in any sense, states
would have limited interests in environmental protection. In
principle, a nation could argue that it aims to eliminate the
externalities of some out-of-state minority that has been
unsuccessful to push for their interests in the legislative process
in their own state. There are, however, problems with that
approach. Such minority would normally have a voice and
representation in the legislative process of their own state and
interference by another state would appear undemocratic. Future
generations would obviously not have a voice but it would be
difficult to justify why a state knows the preference of future

161. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.173, WTO Doc.
WT/DS400/AB/R & WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014) [hereinafter EU – Seals
(AB)]; United States – Shrimp (AB), supra note 116, ¶ 133.
162. Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den
Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-2160, ¶¶ 11–12.
163. Id. ¶ 16.
164. POSNER, supra note 25, at 53–54.
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generations in another state better than that state itself.
Potentially, the state adopting the PPM rule could try and argue
that on the basis of scientific evidence the polluting state is
endangering its future existence and that it therefore is evident
that it is harming the utility and/or welfare of its future
generations.165
Apart from the concerns related to future generations, it
should also not be forgotten that the state adopting the measure
often has at least a minimal environmental interest because of
the global nature of any pollution. Simultaneously, by furthering
the interests of its own population and a small group of out-ofstate individuals, the state taking action may in fact tilt the
outcome of the out-of-state legislative process, which may have
been the societal optimal internalization of externalities for that
state. These opposing interests appear very difficult to reconcile.
2.

The Morality Approach

The interest of any state to mitigate the out-of-state share of
environmental effects could alternatively be regarded as a moral
concern. WTO panels and appellate bodies have often made
references to other international agreements. These may be
relevant, as they illustrate the context in which the GATT and
the TBT are to be interpreted. Both the Stockholm Declaration of
1972 and the Rio Declaration of 1992 include a commitment by
the signatories not to cause environmental damage abroad.166 In
case a state imports products that have been produced in a
manner that is harmful to the environment, the importing state
contributes to the environmental damage by increasing the
demand of the product. The obligation that stems from these
declarations could even be read to indicate that there actually is
not only a right to take restrictive actions on PPMs abroad but an
165. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). This socalled Brundtland report emphasized that economic development should
compromise neither present nor future generations. Id. Under trade law,
externalities may be tackled, but, with a lack of representation, the interests of
future generations may often be neglected.
166. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) (Aug. 12,
1992); U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the U.N.
Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 5 (1972).
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international moral duty.167 Yet, the declarations are not legally
binding.
Moving to a legal analysis of legally binding trade law, this
paper notes that the existence of public morality as a ground of
justification in the TFEU and the WTO Agreements may prove
crucial, as it would at least leave the door open for the argument
that out-of-state environmental effects may fall within the scope
of the legitimate objective. The grounds of justification listed in
Article 36 of the TFEU include public morality and policy.168
Public morality is also mentioned in Article XX(a) of the GATT.169
Although there is no explicit reference to morals in the TBT
agreement, the panel has stated that the open list in Article 2.2
TBT invites parties to rely on public morals as a justification
ground.170
The concepts of public policy and morality are fairly abstract
and vague. In WTO law, for example, public morals have been
defined as “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by
or on behalf of a community or nation.”171 The ECJ has accepted
that limitations on the import of pornographic materials were
justifiable on moral grounds, and Member States have a wide
discretion in defining their moral policy.172
In Omega
Spielhallen, the ECJ stated that games simulating acts of
homicide could be banned on moral grounds and referred to
general principles of EU law stemming from internationally
recognized human rights.173
Internationally recognized
principles were also referred to in Dynamic Medien, where the
court accepted that the protection of young children may require

167. WIERS, supra note 124, at 296 n.245; HOWSE, supra note 143, at 107 n.39.
168. TFEU, supra note 5, art. 36.
169. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, 55 U.N.T.S. at
262.
170. Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 7.418, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R
(Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter EU – Seals].
171. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.465, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10,
2004).
172. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn & Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3797, ¶¶ 15–16.
173. Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 34–35.
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limitations on the distribution of videos and images.174 In
addition, even if the protection against gambling is difficult to
link directly to any international treaty or principle, the ECJ has
in several cases confirmed that limitations to gambling may be
implemented on public policy and moral grounds.175 The same
approach has applied in WTO law.176 All in all, moral objectives
do not need to correspond with any broad international
consensus, but must reflect concerns that can, from an
international perspective, be regarded as genuinely moral
concerns.
Even if public morality and policy would be a valid ground of
justification, the measures still need to be proportional. One could
argue that the purpose of a restriction taken by a government on
moral grounds is, at least in part, to protect the moral
consciousness of its people. Under such view, most measures
would easily be deemed suitable and necessary. This approach
has never been adopted in EU law. Instead, the proportionality of
the measure has been tested in relation to more concrete
objectives, for example, child protection,177 or the ECJ has opted
not to discuss alternative measures in detail.178 In sum, no signs
have emerged that public morals would extend to the protection
of environmental effects out-of-state.
The boundaries of public morals as a ground for justification
have been extended the furthest in WTO law through a recent
decision in the EU – Seals case. The case concerned an EU ban on
the sale and import of seal products due to evidence that many
are killed in an inhumane manner.179 Only limited exceptions
174. Case C-244/06, Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG,
2008 E.C.R. I-533, ¶¶ 39–44.
175. Case C-65/05, Comm’n v. Greece, 2006 E.C.R. I-10344, ¶ 31–38; Case C243/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Piergiorgio Gambelli & Others, 2003
E.C.R. I-13076, ¶ 63; Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise v. Gerhart
Schindler & Jörg Schindler, 1994 E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 60–61.
176. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 296–99, WTO Doc.
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (concerning the application of the GATS); see
also EU – Seals (AB), supra note 161, ¶¶ 5.177–.179 (accepting the protection of
seal welfare was accepted as a genuine moral objective in the EU without any
discussion on international moral views).
177. Dynamic Medien, 2008 E.C.R. I-533, ¶ 46.
178. Omega Spielhallen, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶ 39.
179. See EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.4.
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covering, for example, seal products sold by Greenlandic Inuits,
were granted.180 The panel seemed to acknowledge the links
between health, environment, and morals as it ultimately
concluded that animal welfare could in principle be protected on
moral grounds.181 It seemed to imply that the legitimate ground
of protection was thus seal welfare and the moral implications
thereof for EU citizens.182 The Appellate Body seemed to approve
this interpretation, but added that it had no intention to rule on
the territorial scope of the grounds of justification.183 Hence, the
legitimate objective could not be interpreted to have been the
protection of animal health out-of-state.
By linking animal welfare to morality, the panel and the
Appellate Body established a broad interpretation that extended
morals beyond the protection of vulnerable people against the
negative effects they may inflict on themselves through the
consumption of goods that are considered morally questionable.
The unwillingness to rule on the territorial scope of the grounds
of justification and the subsequent proportionality analysis also
reveal a broadening of the public morals exception in another
dimension. To begin with, seals were not deemed migratory nor
did the AB refer to any benefits on global biodiversity resulting
from seal protection. The focus was instead on the moral wellbeing of EU citizens. With a ban on seal imports, the utility of EU
citizens were presumed to increase because they would no longer
participate through consumption in the inhumane killing of seals
and the total number of inhumanely killed seals would globally
drop.184 Much analysis was devoted to verifying that the number
of seals killed inhumanely could be presumed to fall as a result of
the ban.185
On the one hand, the protection of public morals and the
protection of the animal’s health or the environment out-of-state

180. E.g., EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.4. The exemptions complicate
the analysis of whether the law actually represented a PPM rule since the ban
was in part linked to the identity of the hunter and the type of the hunt. See id.
¶ 7.3. This aspect is, however, not crucial for the analysis in this article.
181. See id. ¶¶ 7.3, 7.274, 7.404.
182. Id. ¶¶ 7.409-.410.
183. Id. ¶ 5.173.
184. Id. ¶¶ 5.198, 5.222–.226.
185. EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶¶ 5.234–.254.
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becomes so intertwined in EU – Seals that morals as a ground of
justification in practice extends to the protection of “purely”
extraterritorial health and environment, which was portrayed as
partly problematic above. On the other hand, by extending the
interpretation of public morals the panel and the Appellate Body
invited states to tackle also moral externalities.
To what extent could the reasoning in EU – Seals then be
transposed to PPM cases in the energy sector? In its
proportionality review, the Appellate Body considered
sustainability labels as a potential alternative to the ban but
concluded that labels in this case could not achieve the same
objective.186 The reason for this is that no hunting method
guarantees humane kills of the seals.187 A labeling scheme may
thus only result in increased hunts as the hunters need more
attempts to get humane kills and thus to serve the EU market. 188
Energy may be decisively different in this respect, as the
sustainability of the PPM is easier to control and labeling a viable
alternative. Even if moral concerns may arise, states would not
need to introduce import restrictions, but could allow its
individual consumers to make the decision to buy or not to buy
certain forms of energy on the basis of their moral beliefs. This
would allow consumers to terminate their personal contribution
to what they feel as immoral and to some degree cause a
reduction in the morally questionable activity worldwide. The role
of the state would be narrowed down to ensuring that the
information on the PPMs of imports is provided on the market.
Going beyond that could be argued to constitute a form of moral
imperialism.
Labeling fuels in accordance with their sustainability would
not be too much of a problem. Admittedly, electricity would
present its own challenges as power along wires cannot be
segregated and individually labeled. Instead, the labeling system
would need to be linked to contracts, which gives rise to its own
technical complexities. As a practical matter, electricity trade
between WTO parties is still very limited.

186. EU – Seals, supra note 170, ¶ 5.278–.279.
187. See id. ¶ 5.278.
188. Id. ¶ 2.14.
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On a final note, even if public morals were legitimate and
applicable grounds of justification in EU – Seals, the Appellate
Body in the end concluded that the ban fell foul of the GATT due
to the arbitrary discriminatory nature of the law when taking
into account the exemptions that had been awarded to, for
example, Inuit communities.189 This highlights the importance of
the details of any state measure in ensuring compatibility with
trade law.
3.

High Degree of Regional Integration as an
Explanatory Variable?

The United States (and also, in fact, the EU) has created not
only a free trade regime but also an area of free movement of
persons. Citizens of each state may move easily in the common
territory of the union. This could create a heightened interest for
the people of one state in the (environmental) policies of other
states within the union. Yet, they lack political representation in
other states and representation through union and federal
institutions respectively may only partially compensate. These
observations on the functions of unions and federal states could
actually provide at least some argument for why globalism—
defined by Farber as the acceptance of pure foreign out-of-state
environmental protection as a legitimate objective190—could get a
stronger foothold in trade law of closer unions like the EU and
the United States. However, as the discussion in previous
sections revealed, globalism has in fact gained more of a foothold
under WTO law than in the closer European union. What about
the United States’ doctrine?
The test applied in the context of the U.S. Dormant
Commerce Clause states that the harm must be local.191 Thus, in
the United States, it has also been argued that mitigating purely
out-of-state environmental harm does not form a legitimate
objective.192 The Supreme Court would appear to accept this

189. EU – Seals (AB), supra note 161, ¶¶ 5.338–.339.
190. Farber, supra note 150, at 1272.
191. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
192. GERADIN, supra note 137, at 66 (drawing the same conclusion with
regards to EU law).
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approach.193 The U.S. doctrine appears even more hostile toward
globalism than EU free movement law, not to mention WTO law.
The extraterritoriality doctrine in law of prohibition condemns
measures that represent the exercise of control over out-of-state
conduct.194 This already reflects scepticism against the objective
of states to affect activities in other territories.
Moreover, under the Dormant Commerce Clause, public
morality has rarely been discussed as a legitimate objective. For
example, in 2014, a case was brought relating to the
constitutionality of a California regulation195 that prohibited
selling eggs from hens that were kept in cages below a minimum
size stricter than the federal standard.196 Among other things,
the complaint has argued that the law breaches the Dormant
Commerce Clause.197 The emphasis in the arguments was mostly
on the potential reduction of salmonella risks stemming from the
well-being of the hens and the contribution that would have for
local public health in California.198 However, some NGOs have,
in their amici curiae, claimed that protection against animal
cruelty is a valid local objective as it links to both health and
morality.199 This view could gain support from the fact that the
U.S. Constitution is regarded as leaving questions of morality
largely to the states.200 Yet, there is still much uncertainty
around the question of whether morality would be accepted as a
ground of justification since there are no strong precedents on
pure moral concerns as legitimate local objectives under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
All in all, empiricism would not support the theory of a
positive link between “common union territory” and globalism.
On the contrary, with a closer union appears to come a stronger
193. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
194. See supra Part III.
195. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 3, § 1350 (2013).
196. Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
197. Complaint ¶ 8, Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJMKJN).
198. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1065.
199. E.g., Brief for Animal Legal Defense, Fund, Compassion Over Killing, Inc.
& Farm Sanctuary, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v.
Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN).
200. Robert J. Pushaw Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 886–87 (2005).
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rejection of globalism. In fact, the prohibition of extraterritoriality
in the United States has been linked to national solidarity and
structural federalism.201 The explanation may also relate to the
relationship between free trade and morality. The federal system
of the United States creates a union that, at least in theory,
should rely on common fundamental values. Consequently, states
would have no independent morals to protect. Strong unionism
would thus nullify morality arguments and hence leave the
globalist approach without any valid justification.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article started with the presumption that states as
parties to a free trade regime may utilize the grounds of
justification to successfully defend attempts to limit externalities.
Subsequent analysis revealed that only the U.S. Dormant
Commerce Clause contains an extraterritoriality test in the law of
prohibition. Although the courts might be shaping a test that
strikes down measures such as PPM rules that simultaneously
have a form of extraterritorial effects and that hinder market
access, such a test should usually not bar the implementation of
schemes for promoting renewable energy, at least as long as they
do not have facially discriminatory components such as in-state
quotas or requirements.
The analysis of extraterritoriality in law of justification
proved more complex and the tests may set some limitations to
permitted measures for dealing with externalities across all three
jurisdictions. Namely, it follows from the principle of
representation that the externalities targeted should be those
experienced on in-state territory. Environmental externalities
experienced purely by out-of-state individuals are for them to
tackle through their in-state legislative process. Yet, there are
almost no environmental effects that would not become global in
the long term. Here a de minimis threshold may restrict the
efforts of a state to tackle such minimal effects. Such threshold
may arise either as a separate test or as a consequence of the

201. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); Am. Fuel &
Petrochemical Mfr. v. O’Keeffe, No. 3:15-cv-00467-AA, 2015 WL 5665232, at *9
(D. Or., Sept. 23, 2015).
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proportionality review under which smaller benefits may be more
difficult to justify.
The dilemma can also be seen as a clash between the
interests of the state adopting the measure to tackle its minimal
environmental externalities and the interest of the state of
production to defend its national status of a domestically optimal
level of internationalization of externalities. The question is
whether trade agreements offer legally valid arguments to
challenge what often is perceived as eco-imperialism. Even if
there is no explicit limitation on the use of minimal
environmental interests to defend PPM rules, the argument that
they are disproportionate and arbitrary is to be expected.
Especially in close unions such as the EU and the United States,
solidarity between the states would also offer an argument why
states perhaps may not adopt PPM rules with minimal
environmental gain as the measure simultaneously would nullify
the democratic decision of the producing state to optimally
internalize the externalities for its people through less strict
environmental criteria. While this argument would not be equally
strong in a WTO context, one should keep in mind the political
reality and the fact that an interpretation of the WTO
agreements too open to eco-imperialism may estrange developing
countries from the organization.
The limits that stem from the extraterritoriality test as
applied in connection with environmental grounds of justification
were not the full story. It was explained that both the EU and the
WTO have included the protection of public morals as a ground of
justification in their trade law regimes. Some goods and services
are considered immoral because of how they may harm the
utilizer at the stage of consumption. Rather than a question of
utility maximization, the prohibition of these may potentially
relate to the effect they would have on vulnerable individuals in
the long-term and thus also on societal burden and stability. In
other words, the public morals exemption could in this context be
linked to either utility or welfare maximization.
Transposing the public morality exemption to the context of
environmental externalities out-of-state gives a different picture.
Moral externalities may arise, for example, from knowledge that
personal consumption contributes to out-of-state pollution and
results in a higher total pollution. Dealing with these would not
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serve welfare but may increase local utility. Yet it should be
reminded that trade law does not welcome measures tackling
externalities that extreme patriots are burdened buy as a
consequence of trade with out-of-state actors. Approving other
purely emotional dimensions could consequently be regarded as
incoherent. Moreover, a broad reading of public morals may
shake the foundations of free trade. First, it would open the
possibility to question almost any PPM rule that is different in
another state. Secondly, it may be practically difficult to separate
prohibited patriotic emotions from other emotions.
While the U.S. regime seems to be hesitant with respect to
moral justifications and the EU has so far generally not opened
the door for any other moral justifications than those relating to
the protection of vulnerable consumers, the WTO appears to be
moving in direction of accepting a broader range of moral grounds
for justifying prima facie prohibited measures. On the one hand,
this could be explained by the fact that the WTO is such a large
community of states that flexibility with regards to moral
conceptions must be maintained. On the other hand, the
possibility to justify concerns about moral externalities related for
example to the environmental effects of PPMs out-of-state invites
some eco-imperialism that may be particularly harmful on the
global arena due to the whole history of imperialism as practiced
by current western developed states, together with the fact that
their environmentally harmful actions throughout history has
laid the foundations for the global economic divide.
The rejection of the moral argument leaves us with the
environmental interests. The likely failure to defend minimal
environmental
benefits
under
either
justification
or
proportionality tests would cement the idea of a de minimis
threshold. In other words, states much present evidence that
there is a need of protection against cross-border environmental
effects that exceed a certain threshold. Admittedly, this does bar
states from dealing with a small degree of actual local
environmental externalities.
What is the significance of all of this for the energy
transition? States should, under all three jurisdictions, have a
right to defend limitations extending also to the PPMs of
imported energy at least if the environmental effects will clearly
be cross-border. This would apply certainly for GHG emissions
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and in many cases other air pollution. Measures of promoting
renewable energy at the expense of fossil fuels would in other
words enjoy strong a strong legal position. In contrast,
restrictions on activities with primarily local soil or water
pollution or on local biodiversity would be more difficult to justify.
Equally, restrictions on imports of energy from nuclear fission
would also face more hurdles in the argumentation of
justifiability due to the relative weakness of the moral argument
and the possibility that accident risks are deemed to fall below a
de minimis threshold.
In conclusion, trade law regimes analyzed in this article
would appear quite favorable for the energy transition toward
renewables. Extraterritoriality tests may instead set stricter
limits on state competence to impose PPM rules in other sectors.
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